Virtually all of 27 European leaders agreed to negotiate a new agreement that would have stricter budget and debt rules for the eurozone countries. The sanctions for non-compliance with budget rules would be semi-automatic. Once the European Commission finds that a country has violated the budget rules, the offending nation would have to secure a weighted majority of nations to prevent sanctions from being enforced. There would be some kind of adoption of balanced budget rules in each nation's laws. The changes will be in the form of inter-governmental agreements that will take months to work out and to approve. I would simply refer to the forgoing as a non-binding agreement to work toward a binding agreement. The muted reaction to by the market to this agreement suggests that many view it as insufficient to deal with the problems. I suspect that no one will really knows the last act in this ongoing drama. It does appear that the European budgetary problems are about to made worse by a recession.
Moody's downgraded the debt of Societe Generale, BNP Paribas and Credit Agricole last Friday.
A successful investor will always search for accurate and material information. Any piece of material information believed to be true has to be challenged for accuracy before acting upon it. It can be extremely difficult to make good decisions even with accurate information since there are so many variables that are unknown, unknowable or at best estimates. Anyone who routinely makes investment decisions based on inaccurate information is doing nothing more than rolling the dice. I am never surprised about the sheer volume of inaccurate information possessed by individual investors who are absolutely certain of its accuracy.
A successful investor will always search for accurate and material information. Any piece of material information believed to be true has to be challenged for accuracy before acting upon it. It can be extremely difficult to make good decisions even with accurate information since there are so many variables that are unknown, unknowable or at best estimates. Anyone who routinely makes investment decisions based on inaccurate information is doing nothing more than rolling the dice. I am never surprised about the sheer volume of inaccurate information possessed by individual investors who are absolutely certain of its accuracy.
Jim Cramer said that First Niagara overreached with its acquisitions of HSBC branches. Seeking Alpha I would not regard that as a debatable point. FNFG recently slashed its quarterly dividend by 50% to 8 cents per share, due to that $1 billion acquisition. In addition the bank issued a large amount of common stock, equity preferred and subordinated debt to finance the purchase of branches in declining population areas. And, I would not expect a dividend increase from the reduced level in 2012.
My current estimate is that it will take five to seven years to restore the dividend to 16 cents per quarter, more likely longer than 7 years than less than 5.
In addition to the large dilutive common share offering to finance this boneheaded acquisition, FNFG sold $300 million of subordinated notes maturing in 2021 bearing a 7.25% coupon (SEC Filing) and $350 million of equity preferred stock. Both of those securities have a higher claim on earnings than the common stock and will restrain increases in the common stock dividend for several years in my judgment. The terms of the equity preferred stock offering are clearly disadvantageous to the common stockholders. The fixed coupon of that issue is 8.625% until 2/15/2017 when it turns into a floater paying a 7.375% spread over 3 month LIBOR. Pricing Term Sheet
For the current owners of FNFG common stock, bought in the $12 to $15 range, the cost of the HSBC branches will never be worth the cost. It will likely take a long time, adjusted for inflation, just to recover the lost income from the dividend slash and the loss in the share price.
There was nothing materially wrong with my decision to buy FNFG's shares initially. Instead, my decision proved to be an error based on a subsequent and unforeseeable poor decision made by the Board and the CEO. However, I recognized early on that the decision to acquire HSBC branches was indefensible and could have sold my position close to $12 range in early August. My mistake was not following through on a sound judgment reached with accurate information. {In my defense, I did not know then that the Board would slash the dividend by 50%. If I knew that the Board would cut the dividend in half back in August, I would have of course dumped the shares without a moment's hesitation.} As I just said, even with accurate information and the exercise of good judgment based on known information, the decision making process has a tendency to err from time to time. Keeping shares in FNFG is just one example.
For the current owners of FNFG common stock, bought in the $12 to $15 range, the cost of the HSBC branches will never be worth the cost. It will likely take a long time, adjusted for inflation, just to recover the lost income from the dividend slash and the loss in the share price.
There was nothing materially wrong with my decision to buy FNFG's shares initially. Instead, my decision proved to be an error based on a subsequent and unforeseeable poor decision made by the Board and the CEO. However, I recognized early on that the decision to acquire HSBC branches was indefensible and could have sold my position close to $12 range in early August. My mistake was not following through on a sound judgment reached with accurate information. {In my defense, I did not know then that the Board would slash the dividend by 50%. If I knew that the Board would cut the dividend in half back in August, I would have of course dumped the shares without a moment's hesitation.} As I just said, even with accurate information and the exercise of good judgment based on known information, the decision making process has a tendency to err from time to time. Keeping shares in FNFG is just one example.
I would prefer owning the new FNFG equity preferred, purchased at par value or less, than the common stock at the current price. That is simply one way to summarize the value destruction to the common shareholders. Anyone owning the common stock will need to express their disapproval at election time for the Board. First Niagara: Just Another Incompetent Bank Board of Directors First Niagara Dividend Slash Without rational dispute, the Board and their 3+ million per year CEO have already destroyed shareholder value for no justifiable reason, solely due to their bad judgment and apparent desire to become an even bigger fish in a small pond being drained.
Keeye Bruyette downgraded FNFG last Friday to market perform after the stock has already suffered a substantial price decline.
Any NewAlliance shareholder that took 1.1 FNFG shares earlier this year were fragged by FNFG. Without the acquisition by FNFG, those NAL shares would in my opinion be trading in the $11 to $13 range.
Any NewAlliance shareholder that took 1.1 FNFG shares earlier this year were fragged by FNFG. Without the acquisition by FNFG, those NAL shares would in my opinion be trading in the $11 to $13 range.
GE (own 497+) hiked its quarterly dividend by two cents. GE Board of Directors Authorizes Increase in Quarterly Dividend The new quarterly rate will be 17 cents per share. The next ex date is 12/22/11. I am reinvesting the dividend.
The China Fund, a CEF, declared a large year end distribution. When I saw this information, I elected to change my distribution option to reinvestment. The total aggregate dividend will be $2.9964 per share, payable 12/29/11 to shareholders of record on 12/23. The ex dividend date will be 12/21/11. Of the total amount, $2.8222 will be a long term capital gain distribution.
The China Fund, a CEF, declared a large year end distribution. When I saw this information, I elected to change my distribution option to reinvestment. The total aggregate dividend will be $2.9964 per share, payable 12/29/11 to shareholders of record on 12/23. The ex dividend date will be 12/21/11. Of the total amount, $2.8222 will be a long term capital gain distribution.
1. Sold 100 IFO at $11.22 Last Thursday (see Disclaimer): IFO is a Citigroup Funding "principal protected" senior unsecured note. I recently increased my exposure to Citigroup by adding to my position in another "principal protected" senior note, MTY, and said then that I would sell another to bring my overall exposure to Citigroup back to my comfort level. Item # 1 Bought 100 MTY at $10.03 I am now back down to eight $1000 par value Citigroup "principal protected" unsecured senior notes.
I suspect that most of my profit in IFO was harvested with this sale, but will not know for sure until that note matures in late 2012. Item # 1 Bought 100 IFO at $9.35
| 2011 Roth IRA 100 Shares IFO Realized Gain +204.98 |
IFO is one of the more unusual "principal protected notes". Generally, with a caveat not likely to come into play, this note will pay the greater of 12% or the percentage gain in the S & P 500 on 12/2/12 from a starting value of 1,106.24 on a $10 par value. So basically I sold a year ahead of the maturity date capturing the 12% and left the possible higher coupon on the table.
2. Bought 50 CBLPRD at $23 on Friday (see Disclaimer): CBLPRD is a fixed coupon cumulative equity preferred stock issued by CBL & Associates Properties, a REIT that owns malls. The coupon is 7.375% on a $25 par value. Prospectus The yield at a total cost of $23 is around 8%.
I have bought and sold both the common and preferred stocks of this company. I also currently own 50 shares of CBLPRC viewed as functionally equivalent to CBLPRD. The CBLPRD had a slight yield advantage when I made my limit order purchase last Friday. Both preferred stocks go ex dividend for their quarterly distributions on 12/14: CBL.PD CBL.PC
CBL Profile page at Reuters.
CBL Key Developments page at Reuters
CBL-9.30.2011-SEC Form 10-Q
CBL- September 2011 - Press Release for 2011 Third Quarter earnings.
CBL Profile page at Reuters.
CBL Key Developments page at Reuters
CBL-9.30.2011-SEC Form 10-Q
CBL- September 2011 - Press Release for 2011 Third Quarter earnings.
I view REIT preferred stocks as having more disadvantages to them than advantages. While equity preferred strocks are part of the firm's equity capital, the owners of those securities have no equity interest in the business. All of the beneficial characteristics of equity ownership are lacking in them, leaving only the undesirable attributes including a low priority in the capital structure and the perpetual nature of the security.
Equity preferred stocks are senior only to common stocks and will be junior in priority to all debt. The owners of these securities have only their dividends, which can legally be taken away provided no dividends are paid on the common shares. Their bond attributes are more dominant than the equity characteristics, but these securities lack the priority of bonds or a bond's maturity date, the time certain when the company has to pay back the obligation. For those reasons and others, I regard equity preferred stocks as a disfavored asset class and will lump them together with my bonds rather than stocks for purposes of determining asset allocation percentages.
Equity preferred stocks are senior only to common stocks and will be junior in priority to all debt. The owners of these securities have only their dividends, which can legally be taken away provided no dividends are paid on the common shares. Their bond attributes are more dominant than the equity characteristics, but these securities lack the priority of bonds or a bond's maturity date, the time certain when the company has to pay back the obligation. For those reasons and others, I regard equity preferred stocks as a disfavored asset class and will lump them together with my bonds rather than stocks for purposes of determining asset allocation percentages.
REIT CUMULATIVE PREFERRED LINKS IN ONE POST/Advantages & disadvantages This post also contains snapshots of my trades.
When bought near their par value, REIT preferred stocks have little in the way of upside potential while having considerable downside price risk.
Anyone who questions that observation needs to look at the prices prevailing during the Near Depression period. This is a snapshot of a CBLPRC purchase made in October 2008:
With any purchase now, the intent is to generate only some cash flow and to hopefully sell the security at a $1 or greater profit.
Anyone who questions that observation needs to look at the prices prevailing during the Near Depression period. This is a snapshot of a CBLPRC purchase made in October 2008:
| CBLPRC Bought at $10 per share October 2008 |
With any purchase now, the intent is to generate only some cash flow and to hopefully sell the security at a $1 or greater profit.

