Wednesday, November 26, 2008
LQD AND POM
BEEPRA/ VIX/BOUGHT LXPPRD/ More on VIX AND ASSET ALLOCATION
For me, when I receive this first warning signal in what is still an ongoing bull market, I will reduce my stock allocation by 10% when the VIX falls back to the 16 to 20 range, as the bulls and bears engage a fierce tug of war. This happened in February 1998 with the S & P 500 at 1050, well above where it is now. It was at 914 in October 1997. So, while the future may not give you this kind of opportunity to pare at higher levels, it has in the past. The VIX returned to over 40 by August 1998, which would be the second trigger for a forced reduction in stocks, which for me would be another 10% when the VIX returned to below 20 (when a younger man, I would try to wait for below 18). This did not occur until August 2000 when the VIX hit 16.84 and the S & P 500 was at 1518.
Why so long between the trigger and the forced reduction? I postulate that it was due to people becoming crazy in 1999. The VIX was in the mid 20s during 1999, when the Nasdaq was going parabolic, which says to me that the move was not being confirmed by the VIX and was phony. Now, I have a confirmation of a bear market coming, at least two whipsaw patterns moving from below 20 to over 30 or 35, or even 50 and back down to below 20. Any period below 20 is of short duration which makes it totally distinct from a stable bull market pattern.
Now, I look for just one thing to re-commit the cash raised. A return to below 20 in the VIX for at least 3 months. This happened in January 2004. You would miss a few months of rally. Phase two of the bull move began in March 2005 with the VIX falling to a stable range of 10 to 15. The first forced reduction would be triggered by the move in the VIX to 30 on August 2007 which for me triggers a forced reduction, no matter what I think about it, in stocks when the VIX returned to 16 to 20. This would be in October 2007 when the Dow was over 14,000. The second and final trigger happened in just a few days, unlike the 1997 to 2000 period where insanity started to rule the roost, when the VIX spiked from below 20 back to over 30 by November 12, 2007. The fall to below 20 was soon thereafter, around 12/21/2007 and was brief.
As I have become older, I may shift my allocations quicker and by larger amounts. So I might bail now by 20% on the first move out of the stable bull range to close to 30, rather than over 30, and do another 10 to 20% reduction on the second trigger. My asset allocation model tied to the reading of all the volatility indicators would have also worked in the early 1990s. The first readings from the CBOE VIX, which starts in 1990, show an ongoing unstable VIX whipsaw pattern, suggesting an ongoing bear market which is resolved in favor of a bull market when the VIX stays below 20 for 3 months in August 1991 when the S & P 500 index was at 395. So I am back in at that point. The model has me in until 2/98 when I am required to do a reduction when the S & P is at 1050. I would also be buying now SSO when we enter a stable bull phase 2 pattern which happened in May 1994 and the S & P 500 index was at 456.
A venturesome investor might put that on when the VIX falls into a stable pattern initially, and this can be adjusted for risk tolerance. Being somewhat conservative, I would wait for phase two and sell it on the first significant spike over 20 without a moments thought. This would have happened during the summer of 1997 when the VIX started to warn of a potential problem by moving out of the stable bull pattern and starting to trade in the mid 20s. A more venturesome and fearless investor would put SSO on earlier than me and take it off later. But I would suggest the wild and crazy ones need to sell it after the first trigger point is reached with a spike of the VIX above 30 and a return to below 20, waiting for the VIX to fall before selling. The fall in the VIX to below 20 would happen under my theory only if the market had gone back up after being jolted down by some major event. The rise in the VIX is associated with major events which talking heads may dismiss but the VIX does not so lightly. Then, the swing trade could start for the fearless as I discussed earlier, the swing trade for the unstable bear market VIX pattern.
As with any model based on theory, it will have to be changed as circumstances change. And it always has to be tailored for the individual's willingness to accept risk and their particular financial position. Someone who is already very nervous about stocks to begin with could go 100% into cash at the first sign of trouble, and that would have been great in October 2007 to say the least, whereas someone else would modify the forced reductions in other ways, by increasing the reductions in higher or lower amounts according to the individual's preference. I did 10% and 10% and I will change that for the next one since it was not enough for this bear to say the least at my current age. As I grow older, I am naturally increasing my exposure to bonds.
More Bad News and TIP Pricing
Tuesday, November 25, 2008
Lexington Realty Preferred: LXPPRD
Industrial REITS; WB, TARP & LNC/PNX SENIOR BOND (PFX)
I am not a financial advisor but an individual investor trying to navigate my way through a difficult market. In these posts, I am acting as an unpaid financial journalist and an occasional ornery political commentator. I am also aggregating financial news stories that I view as important and providing any reader of these posts, assuming there are more than a couple, with links to those articles, sort of a filtered, somewhat intelligent, free search engine. Any discussion made by me of particular securities is not a recommendation to buy or to sell. Trade at your own risk. Consult with your financial advisor prior to making any purchase or sale. I will try to identify my sales too but it may take a few minutes after I implement them to create a post explaining my reasons. The sale may before or after the post. Before buying or selling any stock, even one recommended by a trusted financial advisor, please research it and make up your own mind which is what I always try to do. Research would include reading reports, reviewing financial records, earnings estimates, sec filings and prior earnings releases and news. In this post, and all others by me, I am merely describing my reasons for purchasing or selling securities, and the potential pitfalls that I identified prior to purchase or the reasons for a sale. The securities mentioned in this and all posts written by me may not be suitable for others based on their unique financial position and risk profile. Always read the prospectus before buying a Trust Certificate, bond, preferred stock or other bond or bond like investments.
Home Prices/Lexington Realty (LXP) & LXPPRD/GXP/PWE/AAV
Paulson NBR Interview, Zuckerman editorial, LNC INZ, DKR, XFL AND DD
Monday, November 24, 2008
GRTPRF: A WALK ON THE WILD SIDE/ KTN add
The company has way too much debt and is not exactly in a favored business, leasing space to retailers. Nonetheless, it does not appear hopeless to me-or beyond all hope beyond a reasonable doubt. GRT did refinance its debt coming due in 2008 which is more than GGP has been able to do to date. I have previously discussed this REIT. MARKET OBSERVATIONS: LNC, M, GE, C, GRT, GRTPRF AND LEVERAGED CLOSED END FUNDS Needless to say, a total loss would not have any impact in me. I am just seeing if I can find a gem or two in the garbage being thrown out by the street. If it works out, having a 75% annualized return seems worth a small risk of capital. The dividend is cumulative and has to be paid as long as GRT pays a common dividend which it very well may cut again having trimmed it earlier this year. I also read the S & P report on GRT. Nonetheless, this is an extremely speculative buy, more speculative than the extremely speculative Hertz senior bond that I bought a few weeks ago in TC form, DKR.
TRUST CERTIFICATE JZH: PRUDENTIAL SENIOR BOND
The underlying bond matures on 7/15/2033 with interest payable in January and July. Fitch has it rated an A. This is a pretty steep discount for an investment grade bond. I believe that the CUSIP for the underlying bond in this TC is 74432QAC9. The bond has not had any significant trades recently that I could find. The prospectus can be found at the SEC under LEHMAN ABS. sec.gov I am already familiar with this company since I own a short term note maturing in 2012 but it is a small one so I felt comfortable adding a position in a Pru long bond at a tempting interest rate.
Time to Fire my Head Trader: He Bought LNC
Citigroup Bailout: Where is the Outrage?
Sunday, November 23, 2008
Corporate Bonds, Citigroup & Robert Rubin, DKR
However, most of that was in Freddie and Fannie debt, with only 22.7% of assets in U.S. treasuries. I would now prefer to avoid that ETF due to its exposure to the GSEs and buy SHY, an ETF for 1 to 3 year U.S. treasuries, a lesser amount in IEI, an ETF for 3 to 7 year treasuries, and to use LQD for corporate debt. All of these ETFs are low cost and Ishares is the sponsor. iShares ETFs for US investors - Exchange Traded Funds
In every case, these individuals were richly compensated for their incompetence, greed, arrogance and overall lack of knowledge, receiving tens of millions and even hundreds of millions of dollars. Part of their job appeared to be to undermine risk controls. Their penalty has not, and will probably never be, to return one cent of their ill-gotten gains, or to spend time in jail, but simply to find another job to ply their wares. How many people know the name of Thomas Maheras or Randolph Barker of Citigroup? Maybe if you rode the shares down from 55 to 3 you need to read about them in this NYT's article. The article also highlights that Prince, the former CEO, did not have a clue. If you ask me, the issue is not whether Maheras, Barker, Prince and Rubin were overpaid? The answer to that questions is of course they were. The real issue is to assign a value to them below what they were actually paid. I would say, and this is open to debate, that this fearsome foursome had a negative value of about 40 billion as sort of a bare minimum figure.
When you read all of the articles the NYT has written under the subject "The Reckoning" The New York Timesit is impossible to have any confidence, not even a smidgen, in any of the senior managers of our major financial institutions. It is just really embarrassing that they are American.
