Monday, May 23, 2011

The GOP Budget Plan and The Middle Class/Bought 30 FCF at 5.86 as LT/Bought 50 TAN at 7.54/Sold: 100 CBLPRC at 25.36 and 50 LXPPRD at 24.41/Cash Allocation At Highest Level Since Spring of 2009

I wonder what Newt Gingrich was smoking when he criticized Paul Ryan's medicare plan, approved by virtually all House Republicans, as right wing social engineering. FoxNews.com After all, Gingrich wanted to be the GOP candidate for President and those comments are not likely to endear him to the GOP apparatchiks. Gingrich later told the titular head of the Republican party that he was misinterpreted, and  FactCheck.org shows that he is just trying to change his story after recognizing the damage caused to his Presidential aspirations.

The GOP wants to lower the marginal tax rate for millionaires again, and to abolish the estate tax for billionaires while imposing a 100% death tax on the middle class.  Paul Ryan does not characterize his own plan in this manner, but that will be the inevitable consequences of the GOP plan.

The GOP medicare proposal, approved by virtually all House GOP members, would double the health insurance costs for those now under 55, compared to traditional medicare. That cost estimate comes from the CBOwww.cbo.gov-Ryan_Letter.pdf  GOP Comes Out of the Closet on Medicare Whatever is saved by the average family during their working life would be devoured by health premiums during retirement, in effect a 100% DEATH TAX on 98% of Americans.

In the last analysis, the GOP is just innately hostile to programs like Medicare, Social Security, Medicaid, Head Start, and Food Stamps. It is rare for them to openly acknowledge that hostility, or to reveal so plainly the identity of their real constituents, as they did when approving Ryan's budget plan. Gingrich was correct in calling Ryan's plan right wing social engineering.

As David Stockman noted in a WSJ editorial recently, the GOP wants to solve the budget problems on the backs of the poor while increasing the wealth gap in the U.S. with even more tax breaks and tax subsidies for their ultimate constituency.  The Bipartisan March to Fiscal Madness in Sunday's NYT Stockman says the Ryan plan "appears" to be an attack on the poor while coddling the rich. I would not use the word "appear", and I would add the "middle class" to his statement (particularly the upper middle class who normally vote for the GOP) which Stockman appears reluctant to do.  Traditional medicare and social security are primarily for the benefit of the middle class.  I would also agree with many of Stockman's criticisms of Democrat politicians.

Ryan's budget plan is up for a test vote in New York's 26th Congressional District which consists of the suburbs outside for Buffalo.  The Republican, who held that seat, Chris Lee, resigned after responding to a woman's personal ad from Craiglist with a shirtless photo of himself.  Lee is married. This district is solidly republican with 30,000 more registered Republicans than Democrats.

Jane Corwin, the GOP candidate, has endorsed Ryan's plan for Medicare.  NYT Ms. Corwin contends that the GOP plan is intended to save Medicare (POLITICO), by forcing those under 55 to buy health insurance from private insurance companies with some voucher support from the federal government. Ms. Corwin appears to be an attractive and intelligent GOP candidate in a heavily GOP district. If she loses, then the GOP is in deep trouble in 2012 due in large part to their virtually unanimous approval of Ryan's budget plan. When I first read about the Ryan plan, it sounded like the GOP wanted to jump off a cliff together.

No party has yet put forward a "share the burden" plan for dealing with the looming debt crisis.  If you have at least a million plus dollars, own your home and all of your possessions with no debt at retirement, then the GOP plan would makes sense to you. The billionaire, Stanley Druckenmiller, made it clear in his WSJ interview that he was all for the Ryan plan.

And the Democrats have yet to make a meaningful effort to come to grips with the breadth and funding for their entitlement programs.

The government reported that there were 44,199,391 recipients of food stamps in February 2011. SNAP Current Participation - Persons  One out of twenty-one Americans between the ages of 25 and 64 are claiming social security disability benefits, receiving over 115 billion dollars in 2010.  NYT  Are we to believe that so many Americans are disabled? Really? Medicaid enrollment topped 50 million for the first time in June 2010.  money.cnn.com/2011

1. BOUGHT 30 First Commonwealth Financial (FCF) at $5.86 (LOTTERY TICKET Strategy)(see Disclaimer): I have not purchased FCF before last Thursday. The maximum limit for its purchase at a LT was therefore $300, and the reasons why it did not qualify for a larger purchase are numerous, including the meager quarterly dividend of 3 cents and the level of non-performing loans.  For those reasons and others which I will discuss, this bank does not qualify for purchase under the  Regional Bank Stocks' basket strategy that has a $3000 limit per bank stock.

The bank has some long term recovery potential, sufficient to justify purchase under the LT category with the concomitant low dollar exposure. That judgment is buttressed by the bank's refusal to participate in TARP, viewed positively here at HQ.  (see page 9 Form 10-K) Another positive factor is the good capital ratios shown at page 60 of the Form 10-Q for the Q/E 3/2011, though part of the equity capital comes from TPs which are viewed by me as bonds. Those TPs are listed at page 102, and have a principal amount of $105.7 million. The net interest margin is okay at 3.87%.  Financial Results Press Release I would anticipate holding many of the recently purchased bank LTs for five to ten years.

I would prefer to see a house cleaning at the top given the negatives discussed below.

The CEO has been in that position since 3/1/2007 at a total compensation level of $555,946 for F/Y 2009 according to BusinessWeek.  He was the CFO for this bank from 1987 to 2007 according to Forbes.  Forbes shows that his compensation package decreased to $476,758 in 2010. He has a B.S. degree from someplace called West Liberty University, which is fine, except I have never heard of it. So the LB had to look it up: West Liberty University - Wikipedia 

Some of the major negatives from my point of view include the following:

(1) The last quarter show diluted earnings per share of just 5 cents. While that is an improvement over a 15 cent per loss in the first quarter of 2010, it is not viewed positively compared to other small regional banks. The consensus  estimate is currently 35 cents per share for 2011 and 48 cents in 2012. 

(2) The dividend is negligible at 3 cents per quarter. That run rate of 12 cents per year represents a substantial decline from the 68 cents paid in 2008, see page 21  Form 10-K

(3) I am extremely critical of the large investments made by this bank in TP pools that have poorly rated securities in them, including many TP that are apparently in deferral. I have made money on all of my TP purchases over the past three years, and I am not even a professional investor. Trust Preferred Securities: Links in One Post And, many of those investments were up over 50%, with a few over a 100%. Why on earth would a bank pay anyone to produce over a 30 million unrealized loss in a bunch of crappy TPs? (see page 18 of Form 10-Q). One would hope that the person responsible for making the decision to invest in those pools, or sanctioning the decision in any meaningful way, is no longer employed by the bank, but that would be contrary to American business values.  Instead, making boneheaded decisions is more of the norm for financial institutions, worthy of promotions, bonuses and generous compensation packages. 

(4) The non-performing loans to total loan ratio was high at 3.45%, up from 2.79% as of 12/31/2010, both numbers viewed negatively.  The allowance for loan losses as a percentage of NPLs was a potentially worrisome 54.67%.  (see p. 57).  The net interest margin was okay at 3.87% (see page 46).

(5) Another negative in my opinion is that the bank recently sold 16.125 million shares at $4.65 per share, excluding the over-allotment option.  Form 8-K  The total offering with the allotment was 18,543,750 shares at $4.65 (page 123 Form 10-K) Tangible book value per share was $5.61 as of 3/31/2011.   Financial Results Press Release I view that kind of capital raise negatively, particularly in light of the poor investment decisions and loan losses made by management. 

(6) The maximum chart at YF, which starts in 1992, highlights in graphic form the many failures of this banks Board and managers.  FCF Interactive Chart  The stock is currently trading below the level at the start of this long term chart.

This bank has 115 branches in 15 counties in western and central Pennsylvania. First Commonwealth Bank The network is heavy around Pittsburgh. Possibly, some better managed financial institution will want to take this bank out. 

First Commonwealth Financial closed at $5.76 last Friday.

I am giving an extended discussion on this one just too highlight how I decide whether a bank fits the criteria for a LT purchase or a more serious buy under the Regional Bank Strategy. This one clearly does not qualify for a major purchase using the criteria that I deem important.  I view the current Board, who are allowing management to stay in place, as the most basic negative. 


None of the banks recently purchased in the LT category have risen in value to any significant degree, but I am not judging success or failure of those choices in units of days or months.  These include the following:

Bought 30 SUSQ at 8.75 (brief mention in introduction)

I had traded some of those successfully in the past in similar small amounts:   Sold KEY at 8.12 Sold 90 HBAN at 5.83 Sold 50 SUSQ @ 7.5


I will not discuss most LT purchases until I sell the security and I may not discuss that either.  The LT category is not material in its totality.  It can be material when a large number of securities doubled and tripled in a short period, which happened in 2009-2010, and that is highly unlikely to happen again.

2. Sold: 100 CBLPRC at $25.36 AND 50 LXPPRD AT 24.41 on Thursday (see Disclaimer): REIT preferred stocks are now, and have always been, a disfavored security here at HQ.  I will not go into why in this post, but will simply refer anyone interested to my prior discussions.  REIT CUMULATIVE PREFERRED LINKS IN ONE POST/Advantages & disadvantages (Gateway Post on REIT Preferred Stocks)  Trading Rule for Disfavored Asset Class: Sold BDNPRC  (May 2009 Post) Embracing Volatility as A Risk Management Tool In the Sub-Asset Class of Equity Preferred Stock (May 2009 Post); Equity Preferred Stocks as a Disfavored Sub-Asset Class (May 2009 Post) Managing Risk for Each Security in the Asset allocation (January 2009)

I view the downside of these stocks to be far more important than the potential upside when they are bought anywhere near par value.  So, at best, I am a short term holder of any REIT Preferred stock bought now.  I did very well buying them during the Near Depression period, when most of them, even preferred stocks from the better quality REITs, could be purchased at over 50% discounts to their par value, thereby dramatically juicing their yields at my cost.  As I have mentioned, I still own one bought at $2.9 with an annual yield of 75% at my cost.

I made a small profit on last Thursday's sales of CBLPRC and LXPPRD: Bought 100 CBLPRC @ 24.36 Bought: 50 LXPPRD at 23.28 I received at least one quarterly dividend from each of them.

An example of the kinds of returns available on this stocks when their prices were crushed during the DARK PERIOD is another small trade of LXPPRD shares made in the ROTH IRA:

LXPPRD Profit +$807.03 on $358 Investment Plus Dividends: Roth IRA 


3. BOUGHT 50 of the ETF TAN at $7.54 Last Thursday (see Disclaimer): I know nothing about Solar Energy stocks.  I have noticed that the ETF TAN has been on a continuous downward trajectory since it was launched back in 2008, hitting a high of $29.5 in 2008 before sinking to around $5 per share in March 2009: Guggenheim Solar ETF ETF Chart I have only simple opinions about the Solar Energy industry.  Prices for solar panels need to fall,  their performance needs to be improved, and the world needs a lot more power generated by the sun and less by coal. So that is pretty simpleminded.

One of the leading companies, First Solar, recently took a small hit after releasing its first quarter earnings report:   SEC Filed Press Release This company has over a 14% current weighting in the ETF TAN: TAN - Guggenheim Solar ETF

I have been reading a number of articles, pointing out some of the problems and potential catalysts for higher prices. I would just refer anyone interested in this sector to those articles:  Seeking Alpha (May 18. 2011 Article);  an article at Forbes.com from 5/4 discussing a bear's take on First Solar; a  Motley Fool article on solar subsidies from 5/17/11; a Barrons blog entry discussing Total's plan to buy 60% of Sunpower from 4/29/11;  and Barrons blog from 5/17 on Trina's earnings miss.

Claymore/MAC Global Solar Energy Index ETF closed at $7.47 last Friday.

4. Cash Allocation at Highest Level Since Spring 2009: At the moment, I am probably at my highest cash level in the IRAs ever.  Part of that is due to a host of bonds being redeemed, due to the Fed long standing JIHAD against all savers and responsible American, coupled with the relative unattractiveness of replacement securities. Both go together.

I have also been selling some bonds in those retirement accounts for one reason or another, just booking some profits on some of them and liquidating all of my GS bonds.  I sold the last one held in an IRA last week, which will be discussed in the next post. I am concerned about Goldman's headline risk. I am using a very small part of that cash to buy back some BDCs previously sold in those accounts.

I find the risk-reward balance to have decisively shifted against bonds and against most stocks, unless the investor is willing to make very rosy assumptions about future economic conditions for the next several years that seem unwarranted to me based on currently available evidence.

For bond risk, I am most concerned about interest rate risk and the inflation adjusted return for bonds bought today with short or intermediate maturities. When I consider that most of my funds are in taxable accounts, ten times larger than the retirement accounts, I have to include a calculation for the potential return after inflation and taxes.  I see that number as negative for investment grade bonds with short and intermediate maturities, and longer dated bonds have too much interest rate risk at this point, almost 30 years into a long secular bull market in bonds.

Junk bond yields for many issuers do not even begin to adequately compensate me for the credit risk.

I am also at my highest cash level in the taxable accounts since the Spring of 2009. 

Friday, May 20, 2011

SOLD: 1 Albertsons 7.75% 2026 Bond @ 88.3 and 1 Dean Foods 7% 2016 Bond at 100.13/Bought 1 Eastman Kodak 7.25% Senior Bond Maturing 11/15/2013 @ 94.875/Sold 100 PJS @ 25.2/Colt Defense

Goldman cut Intel (owned) to sell yesterday, based on its analysis of short term factors that may drive the price down.  WSJ

Another one of my investment grade senior bonds is being called by its issuer. United States Cellular announced yesterday that it will redeem its 7.5% senior exchange traded bond (UZV) on 6/20/2011 at its $25 par value plus accrued interest from 6/15 to 6/20, with the company making its regularly scheduled quarterly interest payment on 6/15.  U.S. Cellular Announces Redemption of 7.5 Percent Senior Notes I sold some of my UZV shares recently.  I still own a 100 shares in a taxable account and 50 shares in the ROTH IRA.

I can also confirm that the trust certificate DKF, containing a senior GR bond, has been redeemed in full by the owner of the call warrant.  I owned 100 shares in the Roth IRA and 50 in a taxable account:


100 DKF Roth IRA Lost to Redemption 5/17/2011/ Net Gain +$202.55 Plus Interest
The 50 shares of DKF bought in March 2009 did generate several interest payments, with the yield at my cost of 10% on this investment grade bond.  


Colt Defense reported a loss of $1.759 million for the Q/E 4/3/2011 on revenues of $48.497 million.  Form 10-Q Cash and cash equivalents fell to $49.88 million from $61.444 million as of 12/31/2010.  The company used $10.338 million in operating activities.  Sales declined from $56.339 million in the year ago quarter. There was a $18.1 million dollar decrease in carbine sales to the U.S. government.  I do not view this report positively, and will not buy another bond.  I own just 1 Colt Defense bond:  Bought 1 Colt Defense 8.75% Senior Bond Maturing on 11/15/2017 at 85.24


1. Sold 1 Albertsons 7.75% Senior Bond Maturing in 2026 at 88.3 on Wednesday (Junk Bond Ladder Strategy)(see Disclaimer): Part of the this strategy is to harvest some profits in the riskier and/or longer term bonds.  All of the Supervalu (SVU) bonds, which include those originally issued by Albertsons, have done well since my purchase, primarily due to the improved operating results reported by SVU and discussed at SVU (4/15/2011 POST). 

I previously mentioned that I intended to sell the longer dated Albertson bonds for a profit, if possible, and to keep the Supervalu bonds maturing in 2014 and 2016 until maturity. (SVU-March 2011 Post)  I have now sold two of the longer dated Albertsons' bonds, the other one sold was a senior bond maturing in 2029. (Sold 1 Albertsons' Bond Maturing 2029 at 84.125 that was bought at 77)   I will now keep the 8.7% Albertson's bond maturing in 2030 for its income generation. Bought 1 Senior Albertsons' Bond Maturing 2030 As noted in that post, the current yield and YTM are both over 10% based on my cost basis for that bond. I am comfortable holding 3 Supervalu bonds.   The 7.75% 2026 bond was bought at 80 (80.8 with commission) last February: BOUGHT 1 Albertsons Bond Maturing 2026 (2/8/2011 Post)


FINRA Information on 2016 SuperValu Bond: FINRA 
FINRA Information on 2014 SuperValue Bond: FINRA
FINRA Information on 2030 Albertsons Bond: FINRA


2. Bought 1 Eastman Kodak 7.25% Senior Bond Maturing on 11/15/2013 (Junk Bond Ladder Strategy)(see Disclaimer): OG who was awaken from his morning nap by a commotion here at HQ, caused by the Nerd's buy of this bond in the Regular IRA.  HK had turned completely red in the face, barely able to control himself, before saying "he was already uncomfortable holding one EK bond, let alone two, and it was just unconscionable for the NERD to buy one in the IRA, a totally inappropriate place for such a risky bond." The LB noted that the OG had recently bought two Edison Mission bonds in the Roth IRA, claiming that it was a mistake, and LB viewed that bond as more risky than the EK bond maturing in 11/2013.  LB views it as likely that EK will survive at least another two years to pay the principal and interest on this bond.  And, after crunching the variables, LB did decline to buy a longer dated EK bond based on the uncertainty about that firm's long term survival. 

LB could not resist adding that it was the RB who bought the last 2013 EK bond:  RB Bought 1 Eastman Kodak Bond Maturing 2013 at 94.9  And LB reminded the Great Leader that the Nit Wit was named BEST HEAD TRADER for 2009, even though it was the Stock Stud who kept everything together, preserving capital, wheeling and dealing, paving the way for a tripling of HK's capital base.  Of course, LB does not hold a grudge against our Great Leader for failing to recognize the LB's many achievements here at HQ. 

Finra Information on 2013 Bond:   FINRA 

The LB would emphasize that this bond has been downgraded since the last purchase just a few weeks ago. The senior unsecured bond rating is currently a lowly CC by S & P with a negative outlook.  The secured debt rating by S & P is currently CCC.  And, the last earnings report was awful, the only word that I would use to describe it.  Form 10-Q EK reported a 246 million dollar loss on net sales of $1.115 billion.

The company also recently sold 250 million in principal amount of a 10.625% senior secured note maturing in 2019.  The preceding highlighted portion is proof to me of significant financial distress.  EK (3/16/2011 Post) The company did repurchase 50 million of the 2013 notes at par with part of the proceeds of that sale, see page 11 of the Form 10- for Q/E 3/2011) The firm does show a cash and cash equivalent balance of $1.3 billion as of 3/312011. (p. 35).

The main profitable business of the company is extracting patent settlements from companies.  Recently, the ITC agreed to review a decision by an ALJ that found no infringement of a EK patent by Apple and RIMM.  Eastman Kodak (EK) (3/29/2011 POST). If the full Commission reverses and finds a violation, then the potential settlement according to several press reports could be in the 1 billion dollar neighborhood. A settlement anywhere near that amount would render it highly probable that EK will survive to pay off this 2013 note.

I did not know when I bought the bond again on Wednesday that the staff of the ITC had sided with EK in the Apple patent dispute:  Bloomberg A decision by the ITC is expected on 6/23/11.

Even without that settlement, the prospects are at least reasonable that the company will survive another 3 years.

My confirmation states that my current yield is 7.577% and the YTM is 9.241% at my total cost.

I could pick up slightly more yield by buying an EK bond maturing in 2018, but LB did not want to take the credit risk. This is a link to the FINRA information on that bond: FINRA  Another EK bond matures in 2023, which is usually available, and I have no interest in that one either for the same reason. FINRA Since I can hold these bonds to maturity, there is no interest rate risk, other than possibly the risk of loss opportunity associated with interest rate risk, that is, buying the bond at a lower price after a rise in rates.  I am more concerned with the interest rate risk associated with holding a long term bond, and only have material concerns about credit risks for short and intermediate term bonds.

3. SOLD 100 OF THE TC PJS AT $25.2 (SEE DISCLAIMER): This TC was sold under a GTC AON limit order which was placed after I bought the underlying bond. BOUGHT 1 CoreLogic 7.55% Senior Bond Maturing 4/1/2028   Some firms do not allow AON orders for 100 shares, such as Schwab and Vanguard, while others do including Fidelity and TD Ameritrade.   In retrospect, it was unbelievable that I was able to buy this TC at $7.2. My best year trading it was 2010 when I had a realized capital gain of $720.47 in the ROTH and $1,000.18 in a taxable account, of which $700.74 was a long term capital gain (plus interest payments). 

PJS 2010 Taxable Account +$399.24 ST and +$700.74 LT  Plus Interest Payments

PJS 2010 ROTH IRA SALES + $358.75 and $720. 47
The 2011 gain was negligible since I just clipped the semi-annual interest payment.  Bought 50 PJS @ 24.6 (November 2010 Post) Bought 50 of the TC PJS at 24.84 (August 2010) (this last post explains why this bond is now an obligation of CoreLogic)  The ex interest date for the semi-annual payment was on 3/2911: Preferredplus Trust Series Far 1, PJS  So I clipped two interest payments on one 50 share lot and 1 semi-annual payment on the lot bought last November, plus a small short term capital gain on the shares. 

I currently own 50 shares of PJS recently bought in the ROTH IRA:   Added: PJS at 24.72 (Oct 2010).  I am content to play with the house's money on this one. 

TRUST Certificates: Links in One Post

4. Sold 1 Dean Foods 7% 2016 Bond at 100.13 on Wednesday (Junk Bond Ladder Strategy) (see Disclaimer):  This bond was bought at at 93.8 last December. I mentioned in Monday's Post at Item # 1 that my two Dean Foods bonds had rallied after DF reported 1st quarter results.  Dean Foods (DF) I used that rally to sell 1 of my 3 DF senior bonds.

Recognizing the risks inherent in my Junk Bond Ladder Strategy, I am taking some profits before I am hit with the inevitable losses.  So far, a few of the bonds that I still own have performed above my initial expectations including the 3 Cincinnati Bell bonds, the 5 SuperValu Bonds (now reduced to just 3), and the Along Krotz Refining and Hawker bonds (both sold).  I am a tad more comfortable with the CBB bonds than with many of the others. This is not to say that the OG is comfortable with any of them. It is all relative. The general idea is to offset the expected losses with gains so that I suffer no dilution in total return generated by the interest payments by the bonds bought under this particular strategy. More on Rationale for Junk Bond Ladder Strategy

Realized capital gains and losses are being tracked in Item # 5 Realized Gains Junk Bond Ladder Strategy As long as that number remains green by any amount, I will be satisfied, even happy, with the result.  

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Bought Shares in BDCs in IRAs: 50 AINV at 10.8 and 50 PSEC at 11.2/Sold 50 HBAPRF at 22.44/Added 40 HPQ at 36.11/MACYS BOND UPGRADE

Some readers have inquired about what has happened to the Old Geezer. The OG has been sent to the Old Folks home for rehabilitation after suffering several senior moments as Head Trader.  Headknocker has shown his concern by reading some literature and making a number of recommendations about what needs to be done for the OG.  HK thought that the OG needed to be soaked in a vat of Phosphatidylserine for about a week, occasionally dunking the OG upside down into the vat, immersing him from head to toe for about three minutes, while playing rap and heavy metal music which might unclog some of those brain pores.

LB commended our Great Leader on his ingenuity and research, and thought the rap music was a nice touch.  The caregivers for the OG's mother have started to call him "Big Daddy" and "Big Papa" after some rap musician or some lyrics in a rap song, and one asked whether the OG had heard the song. Trying to be helpful, LB suggested playing that this Rappers collected works for the OG to improve his communication abilities. 

Some other staff members expressed concern that HK's proposed rehabilitation treatment might appear to some as eerily similar to waterboarding. Whereupon, the HK replied "how can this technique be confused with waterboarding if no water is used", which of course stumped most staff members including the RB.  

LB wanted to know why no one has expressed sympathy to it for having to put up with the OG.  It is really hard being a Master of the Universe when carrying all of this deadweight, plus having the constant noise problem from the incessant babble from that Nitwit RB.  

Louise Yamada says that the U.S. market is still in an uptrend and investors should not short a market in an uptrend. Important support for S & P is at 1300 for her. 


1. Added 40 shares of Hewlett-Packard (HPQ) at $36.11 Yesterday (own:Large Cap Valuation Strategy) (see Disclaimer): HPQ beat expectations for its second quarter, reporting a non-GAAP E.P.S. of $1.24 on a meager 3% increase in revenues to $31.6 billion. This report is discussed at MarketWatch. The company also cut estimates for the current fiscal year to at least $5 per share on an adjusted basis.

It would be fair to say that HPQ is now a hated stock by institutional investors. I viewed the price action on Tuesday to be a gross over reaction to the guidance given by the company. Those sellers at $36 to $37 have to be making assumptions about the future that are dire for HP. At the reduced estimate, the shares would be selling for a mere 7.2 times earnings. To justify their recent selling, the sellers would have to believe, with close to a virtual certainty, that HP will have to lower the estimate again for the current fiscal year and then matters would become much worse for the company in F/Y 2012, with earnings sliding further in F/Y2013. Based on currently available information and a rational forecast, those assumptions are not tenable.  

In the last quarter, there was revenue growth in all business segments except for the Personal Systems Group, which was hurt again by weak consumer demand for PCs, down 23% while corporate demand was up 13%.  Revenues in the BRIC countries rose 19% year-over-year. HP Enterprise Business reported a respectable  6.7% increase in revenues, while the Imaging and Printing Group reported a 5% increase. There is an issue about the revamping of the service segment to focus on more higher margined services, and some of the Masters of Disaster may be focusing on that issue. The company reduced operating margin for this segment to 13.5 to 14%, based on a ramp of expenses to secure higher margined business. Good or bad?   The LB understands tunnel vision. 

HP reported early due to the leak of a memo from the CEO Leon Apotheker, which was sent to the top executives, and later leaked to the press. Without question, the responsible executive needs to be fired for cause, but that kind of person is certainly not going to admit to such a flagrant breach of responsible behavior and fiduciary duty to the company.  

There were a host of downgrades following this earnings release. Just a few examples include the following: J P Morgan downgraded to Neutral from Overweight; Needham downgraded to Buy from Strong Buy; Barclays downgraded to equal weight: Caris downgraded to Below Average; Brean Murray downgraded to Hold from Buy; and CS downgraded to Neutral. For an upgrade, Goldman took HPQ off its Conviction Sell list and raised the rating to Neutral.

I read the S & P report, where the analyst reduced the rating to 3 stars from 5 stars and lowered the price target to $41 from $59.  That price target of $41 is based on the analyst's estimate of $5.05 per share in earnings for F/Y 2011 and $5.6 for F/Y 2012. Think about that for just a moment. This analyst sees softness in PC sales continuing through 2011. All of those rating changes effectively were made with HPQ trading around $36 to $37, and the future will tell whether any of those analysts have added any valuable input to investor decisions, or have led them astray.  

While the future is unknowable with any certainty, there can be a series of forecasts made about future earnings, ranging in degrees of possibilities and probabilities, based on currently available information. Some information is just unknowable. That does not mean an investor's expectation must therefore presume a continuation of present conditions for years to come, whether it be a slowdown in PC sales, lower margins in the service business and a few short term headwinds in the printing segment. The assumption that the future will look like the past is common one, and leads to a constant series of mistakes by so-called professional investors who are paid great sums of money in their often futile attempts to achieve mediocrity.

An individual investor has an advantage over the Masters of Disaster and assorted doofuses, who rule Wall Street and the Mutual funds, the ability to take the long view and to simply recognize that the value of a company is not dependent on a single snapshot in time.   The value being placed now on the future income stream of HPQ seems to me to be based on low probability forecasts, tunnel vision, inappropriate and frequently ridiculous valuations made by analysts acting with a herd mentality,  and an over reliance on short term matters unlikely to impact the future value of the company while ignoring or downplaying HPQ's important moats.

I will revisit this topic in a couple of years. For now, I asked myself whether a buy of HPQ at $36 is more likely than not to outperform the S & 500 average over the next two years, and the likelihood that a total return potential of over 20% could be achieved at some point within the next two years by buying shares at $36.  Without factoring in the dividend, a 20% return could be harvested at a price over $43.2 with a total purchase price of $36 per share. What are your odds that HPQ will exceed that price before 5/19/2013?  

2. Sold 50 HBAPRF at 22.44 (see Disclaimer): I do not find the floating rate equity preferred stocks attractive at their current prices. I am holding onto AEB and METPRA, bought during the Near Depression period at what would now be considered absurd prices.  I also currently own 100 shares each of MSPRA and STDPRB. I also own 50 shares in BMLPRH and 100 shares of BMLPRJ. The shares of HBAPRF were bought recently at $20.69.  


As noted in the preceding linked post, it was extremely odd that I was not permitted to buy this security in a Fidelity account, after Fidelity's brain trust placed it on the no buy list for all customers. (see also: Fidelity Brokerage Extends Denial of Trading Opportunities to Synthetic Floaters and Even an Exchange Traded Junior Bond DFP Fidelity Prohibits New Purchases of SIPs) I thereafter bought it with no problem in a Vanguard account.  Fidelity did permit it customers to buy HBAPRD and HBAPRG, two similar equity preferred floaters with guarantees however and did not seem to fathom the inconsistency in their position when I pointed it out to them. The policy of course has no rational justification and was promulgated by people whose ignorance may be their best feature.   One of the reasons for allegedly putting this security on the no buy list was its volume and bid/ask spread.  Yet, on the day that I attempted to place the order, the spread was just one cent, with over 300,000 shares in volume.  I was able to buy another stock, where I accounted for the entire volume for that day-100 shares.   

Prior to using the volume and bid/ask spread justification, their customer representatives were saying that their customers could not understand these securities. Possibly, one well-healed customer with a lot of sway, much further along in the brain dead category than the Old Geezer here at HQ, complained that HBAPRF was just too hard to understand. After all, it is a garden variety equity preferred stock that pays the greater of a guarantee or a percentage over the 3 month LIBOR rate and that is a lot for someone in an advanced stage of dementia to comprehend. 

I tried just for the heck of it to place a trade for HBAPRF last night and I received the same message as before:


Now I would have been permitted to buy HBAPRG which is a virtually identical security from the same issuer.  

3. Bought 50 PSEC at 11.2 in Regular IRA on Tuesday and 50 AINV at 10.8 in Roth IRA (see Disclaimer):  I currently own 200 shares of PSEC, a Business Development Corporation, in a taxable account. I have traded the stock, always in small amounts, in a regular IRA for about three years.

A BDC, like a REIT, has to pay out 90% of its net income to its shareholders to maintain its tax status.  Unlike a regular "C" corporation, the BDC is not taxed at the corporate level on the dividends distributed to the shareholders. While the requirement of at least a 90% distribution of net income will generate a higher than normal dividend yield during positive business cycles, compared to other corporations where federal taxes are imposed on income at the corporate level, the distribution requirement depletes capital for growth, thereby requiring the BDC to frequently access the market with share sales.  During the recent recession, many of these sales occurred at prices below book value.  

Another problem is that these firms loan money to companies who would have difficulty securing loans from commercial banks.  Many of the borrowers are not seasoned companies, or are mature companies that have fallen on hard times.  As a result, there is an usually high default rate. There interest rates charged by the BDC are frequently high too, often with some kind of kicker such as stock warrants, that enable the BDC to make additional money when and if the company goes public. 

As I have said repeatedly, the BDC is a disfavored asset class for the reasons discussed above.  The risks generally outweigh the benefits.  If the economy continues on a upward trajectory, however, which is a matter for serious debate, then many of these firms will possibly suffer less defaults on their risky credits and thereby have more "net income" to distribute to their shareholders. 

For PSEC, my prior trades in the regular IRA have at least been profitable which means that I was able to collect the generous dividend without suffering a dilution in total return due to a loss on the shares, which is easy to do with these companies:

PSEC 2011 Regular IRA

PSEC 2010 Regular IRA
Some of the prior discussions about this company can be found in the following posts:  Sold  50 PSEC @ 11.5 (January 2011 Post);  Bought  50 PSEC @ 9.97 in IRA (November 2010); Bought 50 PSEC at 9.5 (July 2010 Post); Sold 50 PSEC in Regular IRA at $12.16 (March 2010 Post);  Bought 50 PSEC at $10.48 (September 2009 Post).  These purchases demonstrate my reluctance to commit funds to this type of company and an unwillingness to totally ignore the BDCs.  I have also bought and sold several others including TAXI, HTGC, AINV, and ARCC. I currently own 100 shares of ARCC after selling 50.  Sold 50 ARCC at $17.7 

PSEC recently cut its dividend, another common occurrence with these companies over the past two years, while changing the distributions from a quarterly to a monthly dividend.   At the current rate, the dividend yield is close to 10.9% at my last entry point.  Prospect Capital Corp, PSEC Stock Quote As shown in the firm's last dividend announcement, the dividend is being raised monthly by a very small amount: Prospect Capital Declares the 34th, 35th, 36th and 37th Consecutive Cash Distributions of the Company

This is a link to the last earnings report: Prospect Capital Reports Operating Results of 38 Cents per Share for Quarter Ended March 31, 2011 The net asset value per share, as of 3/31/2011. reported by the company, was $10.33 per share.  

I also bought on Tuesday 50 shares in another BDC at $10.8, Apollo Investment (AINV), which has about at 10.3% at my cost.  I first mentioned AINV during the Dark Period when I made a purchase at $2.35. I am not a fan of Apollo's management who  to have a high opinion of their own abilities. (see e.g. Item # 6  AINV (February 2010 Post); Item # 4  AINV (April 2010 Post). 

Apollo recently had to announce a withdrawal of a senior convertible note offering:   SEC Filed Press Release

The last filed Form 10-Q, for the quarter ending 12/31/2010, shows a net asset value per share of $9.73.  The Form 10-Q for the Q/E 6/2007 shows a net asset value per share of $19.09.  Yes, the managers of this BDC believe, without any doubt in their minds, that they deserve their generous compensation for their superior prowess in managing other people's money.

4. MACYS BOND UPGRADE:  I do not own a bond originally issued by Macy's.  Instead I currently own one originally issued by May Department Stores that was later acquired by Macy's.  I have set up with Fidelity all kinds of alerts about my positions, and one of those alerts gives me notice of a rating's change in one of my bonds. Last night I received a notice that S & P had upgraded my May Department store bond to BBB-, the bottom tier of investment grade:



This 7.875% senior bond maturing in 2030 was rated junk when I purchased it recently.  Bought 1 Macy's Bond Maturing in 2030 @ 99.5.  I was surprised that I could buy that bond at 99.5, since similar bonds were being priced to yield far less.

On the day of my purchase, the 99.5 price was my limit price and the limit price for the seller of that bond.  Basically, the only way that I can complete a transaction for 1 bond is too hit the ask price.  And, the price is also quoted with the amount of bonds available and the minimum quantity that must be purchased set by the seller, So these numbers might be expressed as 220 (5) or 15 (1) at 99.5.  If I wanted to buy only one bond, I could not even enter a bid at Fidelity or Vanguard to purchase 1 bond when the minimum amount available for purchase was 5. So, I would have to wait for the minimum to drop to 1 before even being allowed to enter a buy order.

Yesterday, I took a snapshot of a bond purchase made at Vanguard who charges an outrageous commission of $50.  Fidelity is the only broker that I use where I can buy a junk bond at a reasonable commission.  The confirmation from Fidelity for all of the bond purchases do not include a line item for their commission.  Instead, at the time the order is placed, the price is increased by the amount of the commission.  Of course, I also have to pay the seller accrued interest on the bond.

This is a snapshot of my Fidelity confirmation for the May 2030 bond:


The confirmation includes a number of important details about the bond.  It was rated BB+ by S & P at the time. The bond is subject to a make whole provision which is important. The confirmation also shows my current yield and YTM based on my cost.  I had to pay the seller $28.44.  I subsequently received the semi-annual interest payment which included that sum and more.  I discussed in an earlier post how to treat the $28.44 paid to the seller in interest on my tax return when Fidelity includes that sum in my 1099.

The reason for posting the confirmation is show how much Fidelity charged in commission for this trade compared to the $50 that I have to pay to Vanguard.  I mentioned that I paid 99.5 for the bond and Fidelity shows a price of 100.3. The difference is their commission which Fidelity calls a "concession".   Whatever you want to call it, and I will just call it a brokerage commission added to my price, the commission comes to $8.  (10 x  $99.5=$995 my limit price cost for 1 $1000 par value bond compared to 10 x. 100.3=$1003  amount due after concession).  For those unfamiliar with bond buying, the price is quoted at 1/10 par value, so 1 bond purchased at 100 would cost $1000 before commission.

There is one other nit that I wanted to add.  Neither Fidelity or Vanguard price the bonds that I already own based on the closing price for that day. Instead, a third party service is used to price the bond.  This sometimes creates wide discrepancies, up and down, between the price shown in my account and the actual trades occurring in the market.  The third party attempts to price the bond based on some kind of rational model, based on similar maturities and ratings, possibly including some input derived from more actively traded bonds from the same issuer. And who is that rational person?   LB is not consulted about the rational price.

So, what is the current third party price of my May bond. The answer is 109.5:



Now, could I sell the bond for that price?  No, unlike other May bonds, there are generally no bids for this one. There is a small seller trying to unload a few bonds at 105.  I am not buying junk bonds at above par value and would not buy this one at 105.  I barely wanted it at below par. It gave me a better yield than the TC DKQ which contained another May senior bond, so I sold DKQ and bought the 2030 bond.  But, the 105 price produces a better yield than other bonds with similar maturities that are actively traded. I will never say that any of it has to make any sense.  The Rational Man postulated by economic professors and their Efficient Market Hypothesis are nothing more than snake oil, and it unbelievable that anyone takes these professors seriously.

ADDED 8:57 A.M.: Possibly, I had some influence on somebody out there. I noted that someone had bought 50 of the 2030 bond at 105 on 5/19 and the ask price is now at 110.5.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

Junk Bond Ladder Table/Bought 1 AGY Holdings 11% 2nd Lien Senior Bond at 98.1 Maturing 11/15/2014/Sold All FE on Pop at 45.10/Sold 1/2 WMT at 56.17/Bought 1 R.R. Donelley 6.625% Senior Bond Maturing 4/15/2029 at 93

I would agree with the opinions expressed by Pimco's CEO, Mohamed El-Erian, in his interview published Monday in USATODAY.

The two "principal protected notes" that I own, whose interest payments are linked to gold prices, use the P.M. London Fix to determine the gold price. I have been using the numbers provided by  Kitco Inc. to make the calculations relevant to these notes. I found the data from the actual source at GF1.  This is a link to the P.M. gold fixes for 2011: Gold Fixings | LBMA The P.M. fix reached a high of $1,541 on 5/4/2011.  This is the same number that I had from Kitco, discussed in the introductory section of this post: Stocks & Politics: MTY. This is a link to the London fixes for 2010. Gold Fixings | LBMA The price shown for 7/27/2010, the relevant starting value date for MTY, is $1168, and that was the number which I have used to calculate the maximum level for MTY in its current coupon period. I was just double checking the Kitco numbers. 

1. Bought 1 AGY Holdings 11% Second Lien Senior Bond at $98.1 on Monday (Junk Bond Ladder Strategy)(see Disclaimer): This is yet another extremely risky purchase under this strategy, made more dicey by the poor results reported by AGY for the first quarter. SEC Filed Press Release The company reported a net loss of $6.9 million on revenues of $44.9 million.  As of 3/31/2011, the balance sheet shows $304.814 million in total assets, of which 18.447 were classified as intangible. Long term debt was shown at $221.269 million. The "accumulated deficit" was $119.450 million, up from $112.562 as of 12/31/2010.  So, this is a very dicey purchase.  

AGY is a private company and calls itself a "leading manufacturer of advanced glass fibers that are used as reinforcing materials in numerous diverse high-value applications". (page 17 of the 2010 Form 10-K)

The debt is discussed at pages F-20 to F-23. The 2014 second lien note had an original principal amount of 175 million, so it represents a good chunk of the long term debt.  This note is discussed at page F-21 of the 2010 Annual Report.  It is junior in priority to the secured credit facility however.  One positive is that the more senior credit facility is not that large compared to the value of the firms plant and equipment.  Most of the secured credit facility appears to be non-recourse to the corporation and involves AGY Asia (see page F-20). 

This bond started out as a private placement that was later registered with the SEC:    S-4/A #1  As noted in that prospectus, the note matures on 11/15/2014.

This is a link to the FINRA Information about this bond which includes the credit rating information and recent trading activity. 

This is a link to the firm's web site: AGY :: Strength in Materials

Link to SEC Filings: EDGAR Search Results

My confirmation states that the current yield at my cost is 11.122% and the YTM is 11.389%.

ADDED 9/16/11: I noted on 9/16/11 a precipitous plunge in this bond's value and published a post on that subject: AGY HOLDINGS 2014 BOND PLUNGE IN PRICE (9/16/11 post). If I find out anything more, I will add an addendum to that post. Fortunately, I own only 1 bond.

ADDED 10/24/12:  S & P downgraded the bond rating to "C" on 10/22/12. See also subsequent posts: Item # 3 AGY HoldingsAGY (7/31/12) and Item # 4 Earnings: AGY Holdings (11/15/11 Post). I have a 10+ risk rating on this bond, the highest potential risk grade. Personal Risk Ratings For Junk Bonds

2. SOLD 50 of Highest Cost Shares of WMT on Pop at $56.17 Last Monday (Large Cap Valuation Strategy)(see Disclaimer): I discussed how WMT fit into the Large Cap Valuation strategy in Item #1 WMT and the Large Cap Valuation Strategy (3/8/2011 Post). I am reinvesting the dividend but elected to sell my highest cost shares purchased at $53.52 last December. This sale lowers my average cost some since I later averaged down by buying the other 50 shares at $52.21

Walmart reported earnings on Tuesday morning. While WMT beat the consensus estimate by 3 cents, earning 98 cents per share, the same store sales in the U.S. declined for the 8th straight quarter, falling 1.1% in the first quarter.

Wal-Mart Stores fell 52 cents in response to this report to close at $55.44 yesterday. Barrons published a downbeat article on this report yesterday. The author pointed out that international operating income declined 3.3% year-over-year, even though international sales rose 11.5%.

A different viewpoint is expressed by the analyst at S & P, who reiterated yesterday a strong 5 star buy rating on the shares, and raised the F/Y EPS forecast by five cents to $4.52 while keeping a 12 month target price of $65.

3. Sold Remaining Shares in Core Electric Utility Holding FirstEnergy on Pop at $45.10 (see Disclaimer):  Normally I would hold shares in a core holding for years.  For electric utilities, I do not expect much capital appreciation in the shares and will be satisfied with a 10% annualized total return over time.  More than half of that return would be generated by the dividend and hopefully a positive capital return on the shares purchased with the dividend.  I had just completed two pares of my position in FE, which drove down the cost of my remaining shares to $36.67.  Pared ED and FE: Sold 25 ED @ 52.5 & 50 FE @ 41.33 (5/9/2011 Post)  SOLD 50 FE AT $40.7 (February 2011 Post) I noticed a substantial pop in the shares on Monday, more than 6%, and the LB could not resist just taking the profit since that is just way too much return, too quick for an electric utility stock, at least for our LB who is still in a trading mode utilizing its myriad rules for long term secular bear markets.      
FE 182 SHARES +$807.12


Some of the recent purchases are discussed in these posts:  Bought 50 FE at 36.75 (March 4, 2011) Added 30 to FE @ 36.1 (October 2010)

RB wanted to point out that FE closed at $45.54 yesterday, and that the NERD MACHINE was told by HK to cut down on the charitable contributions to our destitute Uncle Sam in 2011, particularly short term capital gains.   FirstEnergy Corp, FE

4. Bought 1 R.R. Donnelley 6.625% Bond Maturing 4/15/2029 at 93 on Monday  (Junk Bond Ladder Strategy)(see Disclaimer):  R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company (RRD) is a public company operating primarily as a commercial printer. This bond was investment grade until recently, but has been downgraded into high tier junk.  According to my confirmation, Moody's rates it Ba1 and S & P has it at BB+. WSJ.com  As a result of the ratings downgrades, the bond has fallen recently by a couple of points. I would view it as borderline junk given the large amount of debt on the balance sheet, currently $3.2364 billion as of 3/31/2011.  RRD is estimated to earn $1.96 in 2011 and $2.22 in 2012.  RRD Analyst Estimates  The last earnings report for the Q/E 3/11 was not comforting, with diluted earnings per share at $ .16, down from $.25 per share in the year earlier quarter. However, that quarter included some charges and the non-GAAP number was 33 cents per share for both the first quarters of 2010 and 2011. Press Release  The common share dividend is $.26 per quarter. If that is maintained, and it needs to be reduced by at least 50% in my opinion, that is another negative for a bondholder.   Form 10-Q The long term debt is shown in note 14 at page 18 of this last filed Form 10-Q.

Some readers may recognize this 2029 bond as the underlying security in the Trust Certificate PYS, which I have bought and sold. Bought 50 PYS at 20.01 Add 50 PYS at 19.59 Sold 50 PYS at 20.76 Sold  50 PYS @ 24 Bought 50 PYS at 22.6 Sold 50 of the TC PYS at 23.2 I no longer own it.  My total profit generated by trading small positions was $236.78, mostly from sales in 2010:



I had also collected $118.14 in interest payments, for a total return connected with this 2029 bond of $354.92.  That is one reason why I decided to buy back a small position, and the purchase of the bond was a slightly better deal than buying back PYS.  The TC has a $25 par value and a slightly lower coupon at 6.3%.  www.sec.gov  On 5/16, the day of my purchase of this bond, PYS closed at $22.73, PPLUS TRUST SERIES RRD-1, PYS.  At that price, the current yield is about 6.89%.

My confirmation shows that the current yield at my cost is 7.081% and the YTM is 7.274%. The TC would most likely be easier to sell however.

Needless to say, this was a very marginal purchase. The price has continued to trend down some since I made my purchase. But, what can I say? The Fed's 3+ year JIHAD against savers and all responsible Americans has resulted in most of my better bonds being called by the issuers or the owners of the call warrants for trust certificates.

5. Junk Bond Table (Junk Bond Ladder Strategy): HK is becoming somewhat concerned about the amount of his capital now devoted to this particular strategy.  Knowing the LB reacts poorly to criticism, HK suggested gingerly to the LB that some consideration may be given to the overall risk level posed by this strategy.  LB thanked the HK for his input and noted that this expression of concern will be given the consideration that it deserves.

This is the most current junk bond table that does not include the 2 Edison Mission bonds bought in the ROTH IRA account, which is held at another broker. Added 2 Edison Mission 7.75% Bonds Maturing 6/15/2016 @ 86.12 in Roth Inclusion of those bonds would lower the average maturity, and raise the yield, a tad, and I neglected to add the RRD bond just bought:

The green numbers for 2021 and 2022 represent interest payments of $1076 associated with bonds maturing after 2022.

There are several good reasons why I prefer to avoid Vanguard when making bond purchases. One reason is that I can not sell online what I buy.  Another is revealed by the confirmation on the two Edison bond purchase, made by mistake in one of the OG's senior moments:


A $50 commission significantly eats into potential profits for small purchases, while making losses worse.  That level of commission is simply not consistent with providing discount brokerage services in today's market. It is also extremely inconsistent with Vanguard's philosophy of providing low cost options for investors. In short, there is no justification for it. At least Vanguard allows for the online purchase of junk rated bonds. Several brokerages only permit the online purchase of investment grade corporate bonds. I wonder whether those firms have looked recently at the yields on those bonds. I examine what is available everyday. To receive a 6% yield on even a low tier BBB investment grade corporate bond, you have to go out at least 20 years in time. At Fidelity this kind of search can be carried out at this page: personal.fidelity.com/products/incomesolutions 

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

Added 70 BRKL at 8.45/Added 70 NSSC as LT at 2.25/Sold 150 IGI at 20.85 in Roth IRA and 100 HPF at 20.26/Generation of Cash Flow Strategy-One Day's Example/

The NY Fed manufacturing index slumped ten points in the latest report to 11.9. The new orders component fell five points to 17.2, while inventories rose. The prices paid index rose to the highest level since mid-2008.  Empire State Manufacturing Survey (overview) - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Alon's  CEO said yesterday that the refinery at Krotz Springs "should" be safe as a result of new levee construction.

I can confirm now that the PMA Capital Senior Bond, with a 8.5% coupon and monthly interest payments, has been redeemed at par value plus accrued interest by Old Republic, the company that had acquired PMA.  I owned 250 shares and 150 of those were held in the Regular IRA:


I did okay trading this former exchange traded bond, but I would have much preferred to keep the 250 shares until maturity in 2018. (e.g. Bought 100 PMK at $8.35   Sold 100 PMK at 9.2  Added 50 PMK at $8.21 Bought 100 PMK at 9.71 Bought 100 PMACK at 10.01 (PMACK was a one day symbol for this bond when it was being delisted from exchange trading)

1. ADDED 70 to BRKL at $8.45 Last Friday (Regional Bank Stocks' basket strategy)(see Disclaimer):  I recently purchased 30 shares of BRKL at $9.06 under my LOTTERY TICKET strategy. Due to the decline in price since 5/11, I decided to give it a promotion to the Regional Bank Stock's basket strategy, which allows for up to a $3000 investment per bank. Consequently I added 70 shares and may add more with a further price drop. I have nothing to add to my earlier discussion about this bank, contained in Item # 6 Bought 30 BRKL at LT at 9.06 (5/12/2011 Post). The banks had a bad day last Friday.  

In my regional bank table, I do not track the dividends, a main source of total return, or the shares purchased with reinvested dividends. For multiple share purchases, I will use the weighted average cost per share, without the commission in the table. For BRKL, this cost number for 100 shares would be $8.63 per share. However, when I tally up the realized gains and loans, I will use the actual tax information provided by my broker, which includes the total cost number.  In 2010, when I started to harvest gains in this basket strategy to now, I have net realized gains of realized gains of $6,460.67. See Item # 3 Realized Gains Regional Banks 

Currently, I have two significant unrealized losses, both in small positions. One is a small 53 share position in Porter (PBIB), whose management is held in the lowest esteem possible here at HQ, and the other is a 100 share position in Hudson.  I should not have bought back shares in PBIB after selling out for a small profit after seeing some cockroaches back in 2010, which have only multiplied since I bought back the shares.  If I do not see improvement in 2011, I will probably unload those PBIB shares for a loss.  Preferably, some other bank will put the PBIB shareholders out of their misery with a merger proposal.

The odd lot stake in PBIB is currently around a $400 unrealized loss, and HCBK is about $345 in the red.  The major unrealized gains as of last Friday's close are NYB at +$511, WASH at +$368; UBSI at +$402; NHTB at $362; FNFG at +253; CZNC at +$508 and TRMK at +$197.  There are 8 others between +99 to +$175.  As with any large basket, I expect to have losers given the large number of securities held in the basket.  The general idea is to have a positive result overall.   

2. Sold 150 IGI at $20.85 in the Roth IRA and Liquidated HPF at $20.26 in Satellite Taxable Account Last Friday (see Disclaimer): As an investor, I view it as dangerous to be predisposed to believe anything without reliable factual support.  And I certainly strive to form opinions without bias, generally defined as a deviant mental process here at HQ, where information is altered, ignored (particularly reliable information) or created to conform to a  pre-existing belief. Notwithstanding that approach, I may be more predisposed than younger investors in my sightings of the inflation bogeyman.  Right now, I feel inflation coming in my bones, but I realize that may be due to actually living through the 1970s and early 1980s, and starting out as an investor during that period.  In other words, that experience may have made me more likely to see inflation problems on the horizon, and to be jumpy about it, then economists like Bernanke who see no meaningful threat at all.

It is just impossible me to label the current inflation reports as benign or "good", even if I believed in the  government's owner equivalent rent component in its CPI calculation which I do not.  So, possibly due to a latent predisposition to see future inflation problems, I am now a weak holder of bond funds and longer term bonds. Consequently,  I have been paring my exposure in those securities, generating proceeds in excess of 50 thousand over the past few weeks.  I may be premature, or just wrong, both of which occur with some frequency, but I will not willingly be road kill when the worm turns decisively against bonds.

The junk bond ladder strategy is in part a response to those concerns in two ways.  First, an improving economy will result in improved credit risk profiles for many junk issuers, and that fact alone can increase their bond prices even in a modestly rising interest rate environment. Second, typically junk bonds have short terms, as investors do not want to lend money to dicey credits for a long period.  The average maturity of the bonds in my ladder is fluctuating between 7 to 8 years, so I have the option of holding most of them until maturity to collect the principal amount provided the company survives to pay me.  Since the bonds in junk bond ladder strategy are being bought at discounts to net asset value, this will hopefully result in some profits being realized on some of the bonds, hopefully most of them, in addition to their much higher yields compared to BBB rated bonds.  

I also have modest goals with I buy a bond closed end fund now.  The goal is simply to collect a few payments and then to dispose of the position at a profit, no matter how small.  For the long term bonds CEF HPF, and the similar fund HPI, I have net realized capital gains of $375.01 plus their monthly dividend payments, and no longer have a position in either of those funds. So, I am not trying to shoot the lights out and view that outcome as a successful result given the modest goal.  My peak ownership of HPF was 400 shares, and 100 for HPI.  

The bond CEF IGI was also liquidated last Friday, with a similar profit trading this CEF.  The discount to net asset value narrowed to -3.48 at Friday's close.   I have not yet sold a share in GDO (except for a small pare in the Roth Sold 75 GDO at 19.24 in the Roth Bought at $18.63, which I had forgotten about).

GDO is a similar fund to IGI, except GDO buys corporate debt from both foreign and domestic issuers, and my exposure to that CEF is material at close to 10 thousand. Bought 100 of the CEF GDO at 18.6 (March 2010);   Bought 70 of the CEF GDO in Regular IRA at 18.61 (March 2010 Post); Bought 200 of the CEF GDO at 18.63 and 18.53 (100 in Roth and 100 Taxable Account respectively) (March 2010 Post)  Bought 100 GDO at $18.57 (April 2010 Post)  Bought Back 50 shares of GDO at 17.8 in the Roth IRA previously sold at $19.24 (December 2010 Post), see also Managing Interest Rate Risk.  GDO closed yesterday at $18.60, so I am near break-even on the shares.  The net asset value as of yesterday's close was $20.34 per share, creating a discount to net asset value of -8.55%.  Dividends are paid monthly at a current rate of 13 cents per share.  GDO Distributions  This is a link to GDO's current holdings,  GDO Holdings, and to the last SEC filed shareholder report for the period ending in October 2010.

3. GENERATION OF CASH FLOW STRATEGY: Throughout this blog, I have mentioned that my most basic strategy is to generate a constant stream of cash flow from dividends and interest payments.  I then aggregate those distributions to buy more income producing securities, creating a compounding effect over time.  The cash flow also gives me the option, mostly psychological, to invest during bear markets, even during one of the worst bear markets in my lifetime.  In other words, without that stream of money flowing into the accounts, I would not have been as aggressive during the most recent catastrophic phase of a long term secular bear market. The cash flow purchases made between September 2008 through the Spring of 2009 were the most rewarding investments that I have ever made, with a large number of them doubling or more in value over a short period of time.

To give readers an idea of some of the securities that generate this cash flow, I have taken two snapshots of distributions made into one account for Monday May 16th.  The first snapshot consists of interest payments made by bonds purchased in the bond market (except for PMA Capital which was originally an exchange traded bond):


As previously discussed, this snapshot shows that I did lose the PMA Capital 8.5% senior note to a redemption. For the most part, all of the distributions do not make any difference to me in isolation.  I am focused on the aggregate number flowing into the account.

The second set of distributions received Monday comes from a hodgepodge of securities, including several CEFs that pay monthly distributions, trust certificates (DHM, JZV, JZJ), an exchange traded bond CWHN since sold, REIT preferred stocks, and OSM which is a floater tied to CPI that pays monthly interest.  No stock dividends were paid on Monday:



4. Added 70 shares of NSSC at $2.25 on Monday (LOTTERY TICKET Strategy)(see Disclaimer):  LB is a stickler for details and compliance with all of its 2,282,230,474,908 trading rules.  Recently, when the OG was Head Trader of the storied trading operation here at HQ, the OG gave a "dispensation" to permit the RB to violate rules, which is the only thing the RB is good at. It was rumored thereafter, and the LB does not comment on rumors, that the Stock Stud used that dispensation to finish some business in the restroom. 

Since the RB had already been allowed to buy 100 NSSC  at $1.8, LB had to do a detailed computation of the amount allowable for an additional purchase under the LT rules.  Some staff members called this time consuming computation picayune and to those Nitwits and Lame Brains, our 10 year old LB would only say "stick it where the sun don't shine" which statement was the last straw for HK who wanted to install a more mature LB as the new HT here at HQ.   


1. Maximum Limit for LT=$300 plus prior total gains in same security +$77.99=$377.99 allowable for NSCC
2. Shares Owned as a LT=100 at cost, excluding commission, of $180
3. Maximum allowable investment now allowable in NSSC (1 minus 2)= $197.99
4. At a price of $2.25, the LT RULE permitted the purchase of up to 88 shares.  
5. After considering no variables, and just to shut up the RB, LB bought 70 more shares at $2.25. 

NSSC reported results before the market opened yesterday, and LB will not discuss that report except to say the company did report a profit.  Form 10-Q for the Q/E 3/31/201 The shares closed at $2.2, Napco Security Systems Inc, NSSC Stock Quote. This is a link to the Press Release announcing results found at Business Wire:  NAPCO Reports Results for Quarter Ended March 31, 2011